INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the science of economics, with its important and far reaching advances, has been separated from sociology at a most fundamental level-how human values are defined (Baron and Hannan, 1994) . In the real economic world, the values an individual assigns to consumables (and things generally, of every kind) are determined by his or her personal psychosomatic attributes and context, in accordance with the operative plan (which continually evolves with expected new information, and discontinuously changes with unexpected information). Sociologists, and institutional economists, recognize this endogenous dimension of human valuation of all things important. But micro-economists of the mainstream neoclassical-equilibrium genre short-circuit this natural systemic etiology by assigning human satisfaction (utility) directly to consumables.
1 One consequence is static neoclassical equilibrium theory, with its ordinal utility (by default).
For the same reason, the methodology of mathematical micro-economics is distinct or separate from the methodology of natural science (mathematical physics, in particular). 2 More to the point, it is separate in its epistemology and (hence) methodology by not extending deeply to the empirical behavioral (neuropsychological) foundation [see also Hausman 1992, and Georgescu-Roegen's introduction to Gossen's book (1983) ].
Here an important question may be offered-should mathematical micro-economics seek a deeper foundation, and thereby bring about or advance a consilience with social and natural science? Were we to seek this deeper level, an elementary yet important step must (I believe) be taken-In particular, human satisfaction (utility) [or, more essentially, instant utility or "feeling state" (Dolan [2000] )]-should be identified primarily and exclusively in basic theory with all 1 The consumable Milk of Magnesia, as an example, is taken for its expected (intertemporal) benefits, and hardly for the immediate satisfaction (utility). In mathematical economics, however, utility would routinely be directly assigned to the product or its consumption. The rigorous methodology would be to explicitly recognize the "suffer now" and "benefit later" character of the product (which is not uncommon) and impute utility to its value-inexchange. 2 In my reading, the dichotomy between the two methodologies (e.g., (1) unlike mathematical physics microeconomics is not empirically "grounded"; and (2) mathematical economics tolerates dimensional inconsistency, while such is absolutely prohibited in basic and applied physics) has never been substantively addressed in the literature-although there has, of course, been considerable criticism of standard microeconomics in general and specific terms over the decades.
On its face, the small step to instant utility as fundamental should not be controversial.
Instant utility has been a significant part of economic theory since the Nineteenth Century, and prominent economists have determined that instant utility is more basic than commodity utility.
(Leon Walras is included in this group [1895] , with perhaps some irony. In more modern times Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen advocated the approach-see, for example, his introduction to Gossen's book [1854] 1983). The step, however, challenges standard microeconomics-and this can bring controversy. The problem is that microeconomics cannot model human behavior as consisting of discrete or separate activities, each with corresponding instant-utility, placed endto-end (as, for example, an individual who first works to produce a tool, then uses the tool to produce food, consumes the food, and finally rests, thereby completing a 24 hour day).
Methodologically rejected by paradigmatic microeconomics is the conjunction of labor and consumption (also leisure and consumption) as non-overlapping or separate activities of the individual agent. The reason is the pre-eminence of direct consumable utility. Much of standard mathematical economics is based on this premise-hence its keystone character, and unyielding longevity throughout the twentieth century to the present time.
It is important to emphasize that this more fundamental approach is not a sweeping overthrow of mainstream economic theory. Of course there are the inevitable adjustments-the valuable substance of scientific advance. As two particulars: (1) Instant utility theory consigns the essential postulates of core (equilibrium) economics (e.g., rationality, consumerism, and diminishing marginal rates of substitution) to simplifying assumptions. The assumptions are still important and germane, but now serve to simplify mathematical economic behavior starting from the comprehensive behavioral foundation (Gossen equation)-much as the mathematical aerodynamics of flight are simplified by the assumptions of calorically perfect gases, perfect-gas equation of state, and inviscid flow (e.g., in the Bernoulli equation and Navier Stokes equations).
And (2): utility is (re)established as cardinal-where utility is the time-integral of instant utility (time and instant-utility both measurable) in the Gossen equation. (This challenges neoclassical Equilibrium Theory, which is falsely based on utility as an ephemeral or transcendent or analytically irrelevant entity.)
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It may be concluded that one of the most important contributions to the formulation of human behavior was made by Gossen (1854) , an economist virtually unknown in his time. Leon
Walras, one of the founders of neoclassical equilibrium theory, learned of Gossen's book after publishing his own great work (1874-77)-too late to influence his creative process (Walras 1885) . He granted credit to Gossen for discovering the precepts of utility theory, and appeared to recognize years later that Gossen's instant utility was more fundamental than his commodity utility (1895). 3 But the die had been cast for equilibrium theory as the core of standard economics-despite the efforts of numerous researchers, including Edgeworth (1881), Rosenstein-Rodan (1934) , Lachmann (e.g., 1943 ), Strotz (1956) , Kahneman (1997) , and the prominent Austrian Tradition in general that originated with Menger (1871) .
While many of the attributes of the present theory (mainly in application) have their basis in neoclassical theory, the Austrian Tradition more closely represents the spirit of the humanactivity approach in microeconomics:
"[The Austrian] perspective is that which particularly emphasizes: The purposefulness of individual action; the role of knowledge in economic choice; the subjectivity of the phenomena that interest economists; and the ex ante role in which time affects activity." (Kirzner 1981) Shackle contributed his perspective by recognizing the psychosomatic basis for the self-direction of activity (1958) , an insight that was later given empirical support by Damasio (1994) ; Bechara, et. al. (1997); Damasio (1999; See also Metzinger 1999.); and Price (2000) . In very recent years, a rapid pace of discoveries in neuropsychology is giving credence to the subjective approach- It may accordingly be understood that the broad scope of economics is ready or positioned for a new and deeper formulation. In this view, economics is related to psychology as fluid mechanics, for example, is related to physics. In either case, advantageous assumptionshuman rationality in economics being analogous to continuum gases in fluid mechanics-permit a scope and depth of study that would not otherwise be possible. In the following pages the mathematical formulation of behavior is presented, followed by its application to selected problems in economics and reference to developments in sociology.
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION AND EPISTEMOLOGY
In formulating human behavior it does appear necessary to begin with essential empiricism. Instant utility-pleasure/pain in everyday language (or, in neuropsychology, "feeling-state [Dolan, 2000] ")-is a fundamental concept in mathematical behavior 5 6 . Instant utility has been measured during brain surgery with the aid of the volunteer-patients (Rolls 1975 ). In particular, electrical stimulation of specific regions of the brain has produced pleasurable sensations in patients. The reverse is also true, where patients engaged in pleasurable activities have produced finite electrical potentials on the micro-probes. The important immediate point is that instant utility is measurable (and hence cardinal). Instant utility therefore comprises part of the basis for the scientific formulation of human behavior.
We will soon return to the epistemological considerations that guide and validate the formulation of human behavior. First, the Gossen equation is introduced. Because the Gossen 4 An important consideration here is that neuroscience and the Bayesian/subjective approach may resolve objectiveambiguity in certain decisions (for background see Ellsberg 1961) 5 For further discussion see Georgescu-Rogen's introduction to Gossen (1854 Gossen ( [1983 ) and his article "Utility" in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences" (1968) . 6 This is not to imply that humans merely hedonistically optimize expected pleasure/pain-a frequent criticism of utility theory. But it is maintained in the present theory that people maximize their anticipatory assessment in formulating and following plans-where it is important to note that overriding compulsions, habits, etc., may, or may not, be recognized in the individual's expected action-scenarios. From the dimensional/empirical perspective, the anticipatory assessment takes the form of instant-utility (feeling state). This is the mathematical statement that people do what they want-subject to the overriding expected (and frequently unexpected) "constraints" of every kind.
equation has prominent antecedents going back over 200 years, it will be simply written in its final form rather than provide the historical and present development. In this formulation, the individual i has in mind an activity-intention represented by the constraints (guidelines 9 ) Φ as moderated or controlled by his or her expectation of future experience-specifically the (discounted) expected instant utility P of self-specific human activity, and the expected (occurrence) probabilities f that the future instant utility will in fact be realized or experienced. The worldline w is a novel concept wherein each worldline represents the expected-time projection of one intentional scenario of an infinite number of such projections, to time infinity (or the intertemporal horizon). 10 In the individual's expectational plan it is recognized that the progress of real time gradually extinguishes uncertainty (a manner of learning) , and thereby eliminates or terminates the corresponding worldlines.
An important feature of human planning, and hence of the Gossen equation, is that planning tends to be focused. For example, the CEO who is thinking about the effect of uncertain corporate performance on the value of a new bond offering is not likely to simultaneously reflect on proposed changes to the company pension plan. Eventually, in the normal course of 7 See Chamberlain [1997] for the development of the Gossen equation. Here it may be noted that the plan designation k is absent from the equation. This reflects the understanding that the deliberation among several candidate plans, following the "old" plan negation by surprise, is itself a planned activity. This does not mean that retention of the plan designation is necessarily wrong. In this regard, its retention may be of value in instruction, and in the modeling of human planning. 8 Here we adopt the heavy underline convention to clearly distinguish present, real-time cognitive function versus projection into the intertemporal future. Accordingly, "UT =" in standard theory (see the equation on page 21) refers to the total intertemporal utility of the individual's plan, obtained as a purely intellectual exercise in real time. In the present theory, "E i =" is the same thing, except with the psychosomatic interpretation instead of the (unrealistic) postulate of the human mind as a computing machine. 9 Guidelines may be a more definitive term, inasmuch as the individual's purposeful plan is represented, and not just the factors that constrain ambition. For the time being, however, the more familiar term "constraints" will be employed. 10 Here we recognize that instead of thinking about discrete, noteworthy expected events in an individual's life, as is common in the discipline, we recognize that every instant of the individual's life may be considered an event.
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Returning to (1a), the discount function λ is a subjective factor that transforms expected experience into a current real-time anticipatory instant-utility E. This instant utility enters into and affects the individual's cognitive function and decisions, but it is not the exclusive basis for determining the course of action. In particular, cognitive function below the individual's awareness can affect behavior. When this happens the individual's intention may be changed, however slightly. It is understood, then, that an operative Gossen equation, along with its constraints, is short-lived-that is, the operative plan is temporary and almost continuously "updated" or adjusted due to novel or unexpected information entering the conscious and subconscious.
For the purpose of an initial discussion, it can first be noted that Ramsey's formulation (1928) is similar to (1a) and (1b). As a particular, he represented the instant utility of both production and consumption-but not leisure-in his integral expressions. However, a detailed examination shows that whereas productive activity-duration is explicitly recognized in his modeling (for example, in the intrabalance condition, 11 and the budget equation), consumption as an elementary human activity-duration over time is not represented. 12 More generally, Ramsey did not treat uncertainty f, and he recognized this omission as an important shortcoming of his paper (p. 549). Additionally, psychological discounting λ of expected pleasure/pain was initially rejected ("…ethically indefensible and arises from a weakness of the imagination" (!)), but he did address it in a general way later in the paper. His formulation has been recognized as a an important contribution to mathematical economics. Of potentially very great value in the Joining these into a continuous locus of such instants then produces the worldline. And just as the individual may assign an occurrence probability to the expected event, so he or she assigns a probability to the expected worldline. 11 Intrabalance is a verbal contraction of "intratemporal marginal utility balance"-i.e., balance of activity marginal utility (productive, consumptive, and leisure) within the single day. Similarly, interbalance is a verbal contraction of "intertemporal marginal utility balance"-i.e., balance of activity marginal utility over intertemporal time. In either case, balancing occurs on the single worldline, or a coincident subset of worldlines. Interbalance ultimately encompasses the entire expectational plan, with worldline-uncertainties as moderators in the individual's planformation. 12 As will be seen, consumptive activity was indirectly represented by Ramsey-that is, consumptive activity was represented in terms of the quantity of goods consumed per unit time. The fact that individuals spend "clock" time in (Damasio 1994; and Bechara, et.al. 1997 ).
The Gossen equation accounts for uncertainty in the individual's mind as to the "choices" that will be made as action proceeds according to plan. Here the term "choices" is in quotations, as usual, inasmuch as all "decisions" are conditionally predetermined in the present theory. In this regard, if the individual plans to take path A rather than path B unless he sees a tiger on path A, is the decision made upon spotting the tiger? No, the decision was made at the time of plan initiation. Much, if not all, planning is of this character-whether an individual is walking a risky path, or a CEO is charting the course of a Fortune 500 company. Decisions are conditionally made in the present theory, and are implicit in the plan. 13 Decisions are revealed as uncertainty is extinguished, and knowledge gained, with the progress of real time.
the process of consumption was ignored. (In this regard, consumptive instant utility U in Ramsey's paper depends on x(t), where x has the units of goods consumed per unit time. This is equivalent to utility per unit good.) 13 Creative ideas can "bubble up" as the CEO ruminates. These negate the old operative plan and install the new, complete with implicit "decisions." What remains for the CEO is to research, reflect, and learn, according to plan, to reach the (previously uncertain) decision.
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Qualification of the Gossen Equation
It was noted earlier that cognitive function is subject to natural law. Whether this means that quantum mechanics is essentially germane to consciousness is an open question. However, it is useful to draw certain parallels between quantum-mechanics and human expectation.
In either case, the state is short-lived. In quantum mechanics, it is only quite recently and with great ingenuity and skill that coherence has been shown to apply to the macro-world (Friedman, et. al. 1999) . In this regard, disturbances by the environment continually impinge on any given (finite) subsystem, thereby constantly altering its state. The same is true in the individual's plan of action. The unexpected-affecting cognition from both the outer world and the inner (neuropsychological) world-frequently changes the individual's expectation. In this sense, the Gossen equation for a biopsychological system is like the Schrodinger equation for a physical system. That is, the plan it represents is valid for finite time-intervals-from as short as a fraction of a second to perhaps tens of minutes.
Of course, a new plan emerges (or the old plan is revised) whenever the operative plan is negated by novel or unexpected information, whether consciously or subconsciously received.
But this does not mean that the individual is in a kind of "random walk" existence. Despite interruptions, the individual's overarching purposeful intent is typically maintained. For example, if it is the individual's intent to cross the street and he is surprised by heavy traffic, he will wait and then cross. If a company computer unexpectedly crashes for some reason, the programmers will resume their tasks later in the day. And if a CFO plans a bond offering but interest rates suddenly spike due to some international event, a few months wait is decided. It is common for the unexpected with its new knowledge to alter our course, but we typically (but not always) return to the old plan, where the old plan may be significantly revised to accommodate the new knowledge.
Another factor besides surprise or the unexpected that serves to negate intentional plans is defective memory. Here it is of course true that plans are significantly based on memory, and our recollections can be incomplete, biased or distorted, and fabricated. Beyond this, our beliefs may be in error-for example, by assigning an extra-scientific significance to planetary alignments. Unrealistic plans are the result in either case. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California human activity can be guided by false plans. Eventually, however, the individual will be surprised by an event inconsistent with his false memories and beliefs, and a new intentional plan then results. This plan must also be flawed, despite our having learned from the experience, and is doomed to replacement. In this manner we progress into an (uncertain) future
Expectational plans-albeit fragmentary, transitory, and erroneous-can be modeled between surprises, just as the Schrodinger equation of quantum mechanics models states of nature between decoherences. And just as physicists routinely hypothesize idealized and specialized states in their applied analyses, so economists may abstract from the desultory or imperfect planning of humans to formulate models useful in economic analyses.
Epistemological Assessment
The issue now is the extent to which the instant-utility approach in its present (Gossen equation) form is legitimate and useful in explaining human behavior. To aid in this assessment we have the valuable epistemological experience obtained in the physical sciences, and also the truly remarkable neuropsychological empirical investigations of recent years. Regarding the latter we can refer to the empirical basis for : intention (Wickelgren 1999) ; expectation (Fetz 1997; Logothetis 1999) ; anticipatory instant utility (Price 2000) ; 14 uncertainty (Schultz, et. al. 1997 ); surprise (Barinaga 1997) ; 15 learning (Schultz, et. al. 1997) ; 16 discounting (Damasio 1994) ; activity instant utility (Rolls 1975; Rainville, et. al. 1997; Tataranni, et. al. 1999; Price 2000) ; imaginary time (Snyder 1997; Logothetis 1999; Price 2000) ; and constraints (Snyder 1997) .
In view of the foregoing discussion, we now conclude thatBecause mental function does not transcend physical reality, it is entirely within the physical world that we investigate consciousness and human behavior. In this regard, the psychosomatic parameters relevant to mental function are definable and measurable, as in physics. It is accordingly concluded that human planning-and behavior-can be modeled, as physical processes can be modeled in physics.
Inasmuch as the Gossen equation (1a,b) is a basic formulation of the elements of expectational planning, and these elements are empirically measurable, it is concluded that the formulation is a scientific model of human intention and planning.
17
The above may be judged a bold statement, but is this not what is required? After all, basic theory and fundamental principles are not derived-they are postulated, in view of the empirical data they represent. The statement should be made, as a necessary part of the progress of science. The purpose of this article is, in part, to make the statement, among other similar statements, and thereby promote the development of behavioral science.
This, however, is not sufficient. It is required, in addition, that the overall theory be testable. Should this not be the case then the theory resides outside of the bounds of science. But if the Gossen equation has an empirical foundation, in the sense defined above, and is testable, then without further qualification it properly resides within the domain of science. The question then is not whether the theory is scientific, but the extent to which it is correct.
The strength of the present theory rests with its explanatory power, and also with its predictive power (that is, in the "what if" sense, rather than absolute sense). Some evidence of this rests with the insight that the theory permits into economic behavior and social psychology, as discussed below.
METHODOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
It is understood that cognitive function is not transcendent of the material universe in some sense, but is subject, ultimately, to the same physical processes that can be discerned in physics experiments and observations. (Here I share the belief of many behavioral researchers that quantum indeterminacy is fundamental to consciousness.) As a further point, neuroscience is rapidly establishing the empirical links between the natural and social branches of science. From these considerations it may be concluded that social science and natural science are coming
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California   13 together, on the same basis, to be joined at an integrated interface. However, this can only occur if substantially the same epistemology-"methods and grounds of knowledge, with reference to its limits and validity"-and methodology exist on both sides of the interface. And this requires that mathematical (economic) behavior adopt an empirical foundation analogous to physics, and then employ a similar methodology (for examples, regarding methodology: mathematical simplifications must be justified, with reference to fundamental considerations [empirical and conceptual]; and equations must be dimensionally consistent, term-to-term).
Economics

Derivation of Standard Economic Theory
As discussed earlier, the Gossen equation (and expectational constraints) provide the mathematical basis for behavior theory. It remains, then, to show how connective theory may be established between this foundation and the methodology of behavioral science (in particular, economics). For this purpose, two branches or compartments of economic theory are addressed immediately below-equilibrium theory and real business cycle theory.
It will be seen in the following derivations how the present methodology connects, or analytically relates, the two very different formulations of economic theory. This is accomplished by deriving the Gossen equation starting with real business cycle theory, and then using the Gossen equation to arrive at equilibrium theory. A nascent or beginning classification of economic theory is thereby demonstrated, this, of course, being part of the nature of science.
Real Business Cycle (RBC) Theory.
In this derivation we begin with RBC theory in a standard form, and introduce assumptions that ultimately yield the Gossen equation. The fact that RBC theory is similar to the present approach in several basic respects helps this "reverse derivation."
In RBC theory a representative agent who is both a producer and consumer maximizes the following objective function (see Hartley, et. al. (Eds.) 1998, p. 9):
{ t } and { t } are, respectively, "..the set of current and future levels of consumption, and … the set of current and future supplies of labor (the time subscript t has the values 0, 1, 2, …, ∞)." 
Simply changing consumed amount to consumption duration opens the door to a more substantive and concise theory. As a particular, a single integral expression (for each individual)
covering the entire intertemporal period may be obtained
where IU now represents the instant utility of labor, consumption, or leisure at the time it is expected, with the function given a general dependence. 18 This formulation, having an analytic character, naturally accommodates uncertainty f w and autonomic discounting Π w :
18 There is the issue as to whether leisure (or rest) is not itself a form of consumption, since the activity seldom, if ever, makes no use of a consumable (e.g., bed). But we will continue to make the distinction for now, since we intuitively discern between active consumption and passive sleep (for example).
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California 15 where the summation occurs over an infinite set of worldlines w. Recognizing that one such operative equation applies to each individual, the superscript "i" is appended. Furthermore, the individual, in initiating the operative plan, chooses among alternatives, designated by the subscript "k". The formulation accordingly becomes Strotz (1956) in his study of myopic effect in expectational planning.
One more adjustment is required to arrive at the Gossen equation of the present approach.
The adjustment is to assign the dimension [TIME] −1 to the discount function. In mainstream theory Π is dimensionless. This is, however, a troublesome arrangement. As a fundamental consideration, salient parameters in scientific theory should have some meaningful relationship to the physical world, and this requires dimensionality. Furthermore, without Π having a dimensional character one is left with intertemporal utility maximization as a purely intellectual exercise (unbounded rationality)-a superhuman capability that is not supported by introspection and cognitive science. The alternative is afforded by theoretical studies (e.g., Ehrenfels (1896); Shackle (1956) ) and psychosomatic investigations (Damasio (1994) As has been noted, this condition is methodologically rejected by the keystone consumerism assumption of standard theory (wherein utility is directly assigned to commodities). 20 In the earlier papers the symbol P has been used instead of IU.
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This formulation represents the expectational plan of the individual-i.e., it represents either the operative plan that guides the individual's actions or a candidate plan (following a plan-negating surprise of some kind) soon to be implemented, or passed over.
Equilibrium Theory.
We now turn to derivation of equilibrium theory from the Gossen equation-following an introductory overview.
Equilibrium theory is widely recognized as the core of mainstream or standard (neoclassical) economics. Hausman (1992, p. 30, 43, and 53) and also the absence of surprise that would change the plan (however slightly). Uncertainty is suppressed by dropping f i kw (and kw) from the Gossen equation. But note that by suppressing uncertainty the individual is assumed to have perfect and complete knowledge of present and future economic reality, including the mental and physical function of every individual in society. That is, the agent is now computer-like-in the sense of obtaining specific outcomes from specific conditions and processes. An important consequence is that there can be no learning through uncertainty extinction (this being a mode of learning). The absence of surprise is easily accommodated by postulating that the expectational plan of each individual is never negated by unexpected new information, including spontaneous, or creative, cognitive function, conscious or subconscious. This has the corollary or secondary effect of requiring an exponential λ, in particular λ = λ i exp (−α t), in order to permit rational planning (i.e., to avoid plan-negation with the advance of real time due to inconsistent discounting. 24 See Strotz 1956 ). λ i must also now be non-dimensional, since pure rationality denies emotion and feeling. The remaining conditions for rationality (e.g., transitivity) are satisfied by casting preferences in terms of a (commodity) utility function.
Next we address equilibrium (#7). Equilibrium doesn't mean, of course, that time, and activity, are frozen, rather it means that economic activity, in its balance and dynamics, is 21 Equilibrium theory must, according to Hausman, be distinguished from general equilibrium theory, the latter constructed on the foundation of equilibrium theory through the introduction of (additional) assumptions. 22 It is understood, unless otherwise specified, that all references to activity, utility, instant utility, etc., are with regard to expected experience. 23 This is central to microeconomics (Hausman 1994, p. 22) . Uncertainty can be accommodated, as in expected utility theory, but this requires utility cardinality, in opposition to ordinal utility of standard theory (Ibid., (22) (23) (24) . 24 An essential aspect of the IU approach is that myopic adjustment is expected (part of the plan) when the individual recognizes his or her "non-exponential" discounting. In accounting for periodicity, the first step is to divide intertemporal time into separate, and equal, segments (e.g., days). Incorporating this change, along with the additional changes earlier discussed, converts the Gossen equation into
where total intertemporal utility UT i (discounted), with dimensions [PLEASURExTIME], now takes the place of anticipatory instant utility E. 26 Taking account of periodicity allows 27 (2)
The ensemble of constraints on individual and firm behavior are similarly cast in (compatible) periodic form. Note that intertemporal discounting remains explicit, and finite, in Eq. (2)-a condition that is suppressed in the next assumption, consumerism.
Consumerism (#2) focuses the individual's purposeful living on his or her consumption. This is formulated by assigning utility to consumables, while ignoring labor and rest instant utility.
Consumerism is recognized in the Gossen equation by first setting the process-ofknowing IU equal to zero for all expected labor and leisure. Eq. (2) accordingly becomes 
where each C µ is the periodically recurring activity in the consumption of consumable µ in the individual's expectation. Standard microeconomics, of course, usually takes commodities to be fundamental rather than consumptive activity. Accordingly, This completes the derivation of Equilibrium Theory from the Gossen equation. To briefly revisit, the crucial assumption in this derivation is to set aside human activity instantutility in favor of direct and exclusive assignment of utility to market-commodities.
Mathematical formulation thereby becomes incomplete-and it resides at a nonessential level (i.e., from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge). For example, utility is necessarily ordinal (see Hicks 1939, pp. 1-6) , rather than retain cardinality of real human/economic life. As a consequence, the mathematical "richness" that could accommodate subjective dimensions is lost.
A few comments are offered to conclude this section. …As evident in physics, the formal connection or relationship between basic theory and applied theory yields practical scientific 28 For a critical discussion see Georgescu-Roegen's introduction to the English translation of Hermann Gossen's book (1983) on instant-utility theory. 
Methodological Example: Saving
It is important to acknowledge that modern economic theory does recognize time despite its timeless character in core (equilibrium) theory. The work of Ramsey in his 1928 paper is perhaps the most far-reaching attempt to formulate a time-dependent model in neoclassical theory. His approach is very much in the "instant utility" vein and departs from the present methodology (i.e., as far as his approach was developed) in only a few limited, but crucially important, ways. Foremost among these is the epistemologically proper way to introduce utility into economic science.
Because Ramsey made important use of the instant-utility approach, it appears advantageous to develop the following model along the lines of his 1928 contribution-"A Mathematical
Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California   21 Theory of Saving". This will help to sharply define how the present methodology differs from, and goes beyond, mainstream theory. In addition, it will be shown how the present more fundamental approach extends Ramsey's rule for saving-in particular, to account for discounting of expected activity-duration utility as a consequence of normal psychosomatic function, and also as a consequence of expected investment-risk. In extending this rule we focus on saving by the individual agent rather than the community (as in Ramsey's mathematical study), and postulate that while the individual recognizes saving and capital/consumable accumulation as significant within his expectation-horizon, the economy at large (macroeconomy) varies slowly enough that it does not affect his expectational planning. (The individual's economic activity in this regard has no effect on the macroeconomy-this being, incidentally, a common assumption in neoclassical mathematical economics.)
Ramsey stated this rule as follows:
"The rate of saving multiplied by marginal utility of consumption should always equal bliss minus actual rate of utility enjoyed." (Ibid., p. 547)
In deriving this rule, Ramsey, as noted above, ignored uncertainty (more specifically, investment-risk) and autonomic discounting. We will shortly account for these effects in extending his rule for saving.
A word on Ramsey's concern about risk in economics, and its neglect from his study, may be helpful. He wrote:
The most serious factor neglected [in the analysis] is the possibility of future wars and earthquakes destroying our accumulations. These cannot be adequately accounted for by taking a very low rate of interest over long periods, since they may make the rate of interest actually negative, destroying as they do not only interest but principal as well. (Ibid, p. 549) In fact, the recognized possibility of a general loss of possessions serves to increase the interest rate. In this regard, the uncertain prospect of an economic setback is similar, in its mathematical particulars, to intertemporal discounting, as will be demonstrated below.
Before proceeding with the overview of Ramsey's methodology, followed by the present critique and revision, several qualifications are appropriate. First, it should be noted that Ramsey's analysis in proving his savings-rule was based on only one of several factors that yield positive interest rates. In particular, he used the "better times ahead" basis (see his Eq. 3 on page 546)-this being one of three that Bohm-Bawerk postulated would cause a finite interest rate (Bohm-Bawerk 1889 -1911 . 29 The other two according to Bohm-Bawerk were: (a) virtual discounting of expected experience (instant utility), and (b) expected finite life-span. There are other causes as well. In particular: (1) expected probability (less than 1.0) that future returns from present investments will in fact be realized (addressed later in this paper); and (2) growth of technological knowledge (see Knight 1944) . Later in the paper, in a linear analysis, we will show how autonomic discounting and expected-risk may be included in Ramsey's rule for saving.
Ramsey employed a simple transformation of intertemporal utility that significantly helps or aids the application of differential and integral calculus in economics, and this transformation will be used below. He was clearly thinking of community utility in his paper, but he believed that his methodology represented the individual's planning as well (page 554).
Ramsey introduced instant utility by denoting U(x(t)) as "..the total rate of utility of a rate of consumption x" and V(a(t)) as "…the total rate of disutility of a rate of labor a." 30 He immediately went on to state that "…the corresponding marginal rates we will call u(x) and v(a)," and defined these as:
It can be noted here that we consider it quite helpful, if not mandatory, to think in terms of dimensions in assessing theoretical development. Accordingly, both U(x) and V(a) have the dimension [PLEASURE (feeling state)] of instant utility. Ramsey's language is consistent in this regard-in his referring to U(x), for example, as the total rate of utility. The rate of consumption 29 Ramsey did not state that his analysis was based on the "better times ahead" hypothesis. In this regard, the "better times ahead" hypothesis automatically generates a growing economy with a finite interest rate, until bliss is achieved (at which time the interest becomes zero). In the present more fundamental approach, a finite interest rate is retained even in the equilibrium bliss condition. 30 Here we may note a logical inconsistency: The rate of labor is not the same kind of thing as the rate of consumption, although the wording is similar. This inconsistency, to be shortly discussed, reflects a fundamental difficulty in neoclassical theory. 
where τ is the length of day (24 hours) and δ U (t') = 1.0 during the consumptive activity and zero otherwise. Similarly, the rate of consumption x is the average rate of consumption, or
where X is the instantaneous rate of consumption during the consumptive activity.
Implicit in the foregoing, however, is an important assumption. The assumption is that discounting, and uncertainty, vary so little over the course of the single day that they can be Indeed, it is believed that without a proper modeling of time in mathematical economics, an exact modeling of capital and interest cannot be achieved.
Henceforth in the present work, the symbol U (upper and lower case) is understood to be solely dependent on b(t), in the manner consistent with V and L. As a related change, marginal utility per unit good now becomes marginal anticipatory instantutility (feeling-state) per unit good, designated by italics, i.e., u.
33
Having departed from Ramsey's approach by differing on the epistemologically correct way to introduce utility into economic theory-that is, utility should be originally and exclusively identified with human activity-duration-we can now address methodology. In demonstrating the present methodology, Ramsey's rule for saving will be extended. This 32 The rate of consumption x is not lost by this more fundamental formulation, of course: as is the case in Ramsey's paper, it continues to enter the model and mathematics by way of the constraints. However, it now has an explicit and exclusive (as a present simplification) functional dependence on consumption activity-duration. 33 It may be emphasized, however, that the analyst remains free, of course, to postulate that agents prepare expectational plans as a purely intellectual exercise, as has been standard in neoclassical economics. While this understanding is not supported by modern neuropsychology, and our intuitions, it may be useful as an interim approach that makes use of the instant-utility mathematics.
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Savings Rate (Ramsey's Rule)
We begin by rewriting the Gossen equation in terms of continuous instant utility, in the manner of V and U discussed above but with leisure instant utility included. Subjective discounting is retained-in its conventional exponential mode to avoid myopic re-planning (see Strotz 1956 ). Uncertainty (risk) is suppressed for now. Accordingly,
where, as addressed earlier, V(t') = (1/τ) t'−τ/2 t'+τ/2 δ V (t") IU(t") dt" with δ V (t") = 1.0 during the labor activity and zero otherwise. Similarly for U and L. λ is assumed constant. In our treatment we postulate that the macro-economy varies so little to the "discount horizon" 34 that it is effectively stationary so far as the individual's planning is concerned. It is seen, therefore, that (a) long-term (macroeconomic) changes are ignored in planning by the individual due to "relatively steep" discounting; and that (b) short-term (day-to-day) changes are ignored in his planning due to "relatively weak" discounting (i.e., during a 24-hour interval). The latter conclusion (b) validates V, U, and L as continuous functions, and the former conclusion (a)
ensures that macroeconomic dynamics to not affect, or interfere with, the individual's planning.
35
Note that the perfect-rationality assumption is implicit in the development to follow. The important particular in this regard is that each individual, and all taken together, are assumed to have complete and certain knowledge of all future conditions and activity. This assumption will be partially relaxed later in the paper when expected-risk is accounted for in planning. In this regard, the rationality assumption of equilibrium theory is in fact indispensable in economic modeling, and will be always be useful in theoretical analyses in varying degrees of relaxation.
34 For our exponential formulation of discounting there is no "discount horizon." But we may adopt the convention that the "discount horizon" rests at the intertemporal time beyond which expected activity has a negligible effect on planning. 35 Ramsey invokes a number of qualifying assumptions at the outset of his paper that are appropriate to the present genre of analysis. The reader may refer his discussion for this discussion. July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California In the present linearization we limit our analysis to (expectedly) very great times, where Ramsey's "bliss" has almost been achieved. For small departures from the asymptote, the economic dynamics may be represented by a linear formulation to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. 36 Toward this end, (3) may accordingly be written:
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where λ is invariant. Underscored symbols (i.e., light underline) refer to the bliss condition. The individual is assumed to be purposeful in his planning and is, accordingly, assumed to maximize where it is assumed as a simplification that the rate of consumption β during the consumptive activity is constant-i.e., X is always some constant magnitude (β), or zero.
At this point we recognize the exponential character of the individual's economic behavior near the asymptote. More to the point, it is recognized that the magnitude of d(∆κ)/dt is 36 The solution may, of course, be extended into the nonlinear domain, albeit with increasing error. (Linearization of complex mathematical problems is standard practice in applied physics.) 37 Of course, the individual does not have the super-human capability to achieve an identical maximization. But he or she can maximize within the context of uncertainty-including the recognized uncertainty inherent in one's own calculus of expectational planning. This of course reflects reality. Note that by neglecting uncertainty (for the present), we make valuable use of the (complete or unrelaxed) rational man assumption of standard theory. July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California proportional to the departures of ∆a, ∆κ, and ∆b from their respective asymptotes (essential relationship). We may then write
where σ is the characteristic time-constant of the individual's approach to his bliss asymptote.
With the above definitions (3a) now becomes:
We are interested in the rate at which E t approaches the bliss asymptote, where this result will shortly be related to the corresponding rate at which working capital κ approaches its asymptotic magnitude κ. The rate of approach of E t to the asymptote is given by d(E t )/dt . Taking the derivative of (4) produces:
In forming this derivative it has been recognized that the contribution of expression A in (4) to (5) Although dA/dt is zero, dB/dt in (4) is finite. The reason is that t in the integrand in connection with 1/σ is not variable. But t in connection with ρ remains differentiable, as before.
(This distinction between 1/σ and ρ is believed to be of essential importance in economic psychology.) Performing the differential and integral operations as usual yields (5).
With the understanding that it is the individual's sacrifice, or postponement, of consumption ∆x (= ∆κ) that causes the departure ∆V + ∆U + ∆L from the asymptotic condition, we may write d(E t )/dt = d(u ∆κ)/dt = u dκ/dt in the linear limit, and (5) becomes
u at any given real time t, where B is the bliss (expected instant utility, or feeling state) on the asymptote. This is Ramsey's rule for saving, adjusted to account for autonomic or subliminal discounting. Equation (6) is seen to be consistent with Ramsey's formulation. In particular, for ρ → 0 -that is, autonomic discounting becomes vanishingly small-(6) becomes
This equivalent to Ramsey's formula, when u is substituted for u /λ and leisure is dropped. But note that a crucial mathematical (and conceptual) concern has been overlooked: When discounting is set-aside-as in (7) and in Ramsey's analysis-the integration of a finite pleasure to infinity is infinite (see also Blaug [1968] ). Discounting of some nature, of which there are a number of modes, may always be necessary in mathematical behavior to realistically "suppress" the singularity.
(Accounting for Uncertainty)
Uncertainty-or, more precisely, (expected) event-occurrence probability-can be accommodated in our linear treatment of the economic system. As was assumed above regarding that an expected event has not occurred at t = 0, the expected probability that the event will still not have occurred at time t is exp(−π t), where π is a constant.
In deriving this (exponential) formulation it is convenient to model Ramsey's reference to "…the possibility of future wars and earthquakes destroying our accumulations." Accordingly, the individual imagines that in each intertemporal unit of time a small, constant risk π exists that all capital will be destroyed and the associated economic activity will cease.
, and it follows that f = [ f] t=0 exp(−π t) = 1.0 exp(−π t). Applying this function to (4) and rearranging gives
Here A is zero, as before, for the same reasons. This expression leads to (6) in the form
where it is seen that the effect of distributed expected investment-risk π is functionally equivalent to autonomic discounting ρ.
A brief recap of the above development may be helpful. This expression (8) was obtained using an approach that departed from Ramsey's in several ways. One difference was, of course, in the employment of the more fundamental (pure or substantive) instant utility methodology.
Additionally, the present study addressed the approach of the individual's economic state to the bliss asymptote on a linearized (very small departure therefrom) basis, whereas Ramsey accounted for nonlinearities in a finite departure from the asymptote. Furthermore, the present analysis accounted for (autonomic and investment-risk) discounting, whereas Ramsey (initially) did not. (Ramsey later in his paper did provide a treatment, along the analytic line of his nondiscounting analysis, which accounted for finite life-span and autonomic discounting. The result was an integro-differential expression that significantly differs from the present expression (6).)
Regarding (8), the effects of autonomic discounting and investment-risk discounting on saving appear to be in accord with our intuitions. In particular, as expected experience (feelingstate) is discounted (ρ and π increase) the rate of increase of capital-intensity is reduced, and eventually goes to zero as ρ or π increase to infinity (total discounting). At the other extreme-ρ and π → zero-our intuition is again served by the indicated result of increased saving. In the limit Ramsey's expression is recovered. But, as noted earlier, his expression is recovered at the cost of a hidden singularity in the mathematics.
Moving now from intuition to theory, the fact that autonomic discounting and investment-risk discounting have the same functional participation in the expression (8) indicates that expected investment risk is another factor (along with limited lifespan, better times ahead, growth of knowledge, etc.) contributing to finite interest rates. Of course, people know that risk is quite germane in determining required return-on-investment and (real) interest rates in real economic life, but the understanding has not been accommodated in the standard or mainstream methodology of mathematical economics.
Sociology
"It is a fact that ever since the Eighteenth Century both groups have grown steadily apart until by now the modal economists and modal sociologists know little and care less about what the other does." (Joseph Shumpeter, circa 1940s, as quoted in Baron and Hannan, p. 1112-citation data show little change since the 1940s.)
It would be beneficial if economics and sociology could be brought closer together. At present the disciplines are separated for the most fundamental of reasons-diametrically opposed definitions of preferences (see Baron and Hannan 1994): In sociology preferences (valuations) are endogenous and cardinal, while in mathematical economics preferences are inconsistentsometimes endogenous and cardinal and sometimes (formally, in core theory) exogenous and ordinal. The consequence is that modal economists and modal sociologists lack the common foundation for meaningful cooperation.
This great division in the social sciences may be resolved at the fundamental level. The change is to introduce or specify utility the same way for all human activity. This, as has been discussed earlier, is accomplished by simply introducing utility as utility per unit activityduration (that is, as instant utility, or feeling-state) for consumption as it is for labor and rest. Now the individual's, and society's, valuations of goods and services, productive and consumptive, are dependent on intentions and how intentions evolve over time (i.e., how uncertainty is gradually extinguished), and should not be arbitrarily specified by the analyst or modeler. That is, value in economic life is endogenously determined. And value is cardinal, since instant utility is cardinal (measurable). Sociology and economics would now be in agreement in their fundamental principles-the determinants of intentions, and hence actions, are cardinal and endogenous.
We've already seen where this change benefits economics by bringing mathematical consistency or coherence into theory at the most essential level. Just as economics benefits from the original, exclusive identification of utility with human activity, so her sister disciplines in the social sciences would be similarly enriched. This is partly due to economic theory becoming more compatible with social science in general, hence more useful (with a similar benefit returning to economics, of course). Mathematics is the agent-but not just any formulation. In this regard, it is of course true, in economics as in physics, that the methodology must be internally coherent or consistent. It is also appropriate, for the most important of reasons for economics as a science, that the methodology be rooted in an empirical foundation. The Gossen equation, itself a product and logical extension of the history of economic theory, satisfies these requirements.
A preliminary development of a socioeconomic model using the instant utility approach was presented at the 38 th Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA) in August 1998. In this study instant utility was given an explicit formulation-i.e., activity of each agent was not time-averaged or overlapping. However as we have seen above, time-averaging is a plausible assumption, one that significantly simplifies the mathematics. It is anticipated that the ERSA paper will be revisited to place the analysis in the "time-averaged" form. It seems Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics July 28-31, 2003 Lake Tahoe, California appropriate for the present purposes to simply provide a nonmathematical overview of the ERSA paper.
In the 1998 ERSA paper was shown how a stereotypic bias regarding the expected productivity of a minority-population affects the productivity of the population. Here it is understood that stereotyping is:
…a fundamental and probably universal bias in perception which has important and farreaching consequences for behavior ranging from relatively harmless assumptions about people to gross practices such as genocide. It is a central component of prejudice and intergroup relations, and its study is inextricable from the study of intergroup behavior. (Hogg and Abrams 1988, p. 66.) Because an entire minority population was addressed as having lumped properties, 39 instant utilities were aggregated over the population to yield community instant utilities.
Of specific interest in the analysis was the 'accentuation effect (Tajfel 1957 )' attending categorization. Tajfel's accentuation principle holds that "…the superposition of a systematic classification of stimuli into two categories on a continuously distributed judgmental dimension results in the perceptual exaggeration of similarities within and differences between categories (Ibid., p. 71)". In economics such exaggeration could affect the prices of goods (e.g., yield an erroneous assessment of product amount versus product size), 40 and socioeconomic status/employability (e.g., bias in assessing the attributes of foreign nationals (Tajfel, et. al. 1964;  see also Hogg and Abrams 1988, p. 72) ). One such effect was addressed in the paper-the influence of stereotypic bias on the expected economic performance and income of a minority population.
In the study it was assumed that the categorization process has already had its effect on the economic relationship between the minority population and the (much) larger contextual population. In particular, production per unit time-the focal dimension-received a biased assessment (categorization) on the basis of a cultural, ethnic, racial, or gender difference-the peripheral dimension. In particular, it was generally recognized within both populations that the 39 Lumped properties are used to advantage in applied physics. An example is the "lumped mass" approach in heat transfer. (See Holman 1968.) 40 In an similar case, a study by Bruner and Goodman (1947) demonstrated that subjects erroneously identified greater sizes with higher valued coins, and conversely.
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Stereotypic bias entered analysis through its effect on the parameters of the Gossen equation, and on the (expectational) constraints on planned activity. The sets of expected worldlines were altered-in terms of the ranges of expected action scenarios with their expected constraints, and also in terms of the (expectational) distributed occurrence probability across the worldlines. For example, racial bias could cause the individual to adopt an overall life-plan (worldline ensemble) that would otherwise be rejected, and then to assign distributed occurrence probability over these worldlines that reinforces the inclination to discriminatory behavior. At the more detailed level, bias would possibly enter and affect the discounting of expected instant utility, and also the expected instant utility magnitudes. Parameter magnitudes throughout the constraints could be affected.
It may be seen that that the Gossen equation (and constraints) permit the investigation of stereotyping at a deeper level-that is, permit its resolution into subsidiary or more fundamental components. The coherent treatment of human activity, and (instant) utility theory, facilitates or promotes analytical modeling. This approach is advanced still further by plausible assumptions, such as periodicity and time-averaging, as have been employed in the present paper.
CONCLUSION
It is probably a fair statement that most economists believe their discipline too difficult or complicated to be approached through rigorous mathematical formulation. One prominent economist has printed this opinion-he observed that economics is an "intellectual exercise" that excludes "..the reality of economic life, which, alas, is not, in its varied disorder, suitable for mathematical replication." Galbraith (1987) . My belief is that this conclusion is too pessimistic:
We have over the centuries identified the salient factors of economic behavior, and having done so it is feasible, as in physics, to draw them together in mathematical frameworks or systems to explain economic life, and forecast the effects of economic policies and institutions.
In the present paper an attempt is made to demonstrate how the substantive mathematical approach can provide insights and advances that go beyond the capabilities of mainstream that may serve to move these theoretical compartments, and other compartments of economic theory, closer together within one consistent, overarching methodology, as prevails in physics.
Later in the paper the instant-utility approach was employed to extend Ramsey's rule for saving to account for autonomic discounting and investment-risk discounting. The article concluded by addressing an important concern in social science-an essential difference between sociology and economics that must undermine or cloud their close cooperation. Here it was observed that the keystone "direct consumable utility" postulate of neoclassical mathematical economics was responsible for this difference-responsible, that is, by imposing value from outside the methodology, rather than from inside thereby reflecting real economic life. Adopting instantutility of all human (mental and physical) activity-durations as basic theory places economics and sociology on the same endogenous plane, with the prospect of improved cooperation.
When we seek beneficent institutions and good governance we are influenced-and properly so-by the prevailing economic paradigm, with its strengths and deficiencies. Since economic science has this power in modern life, it is imperative to achieve a strong correspondence or connection between economic theory and economic reality. While there may be economists who believe that a satisfactory connection in this regard already exists, there can be no doubt, from the literature, that more than a few colleagues disagree. Economics science does, in fact, leave room for improvement, a statement that cannot be controversial. The science should move to a more fundamental basis. Besides the benefits to economics, conciliation could be achieved across all of science and philosophy-from physics and psychology to socioeconomics and the theories of justice and ethics. This would help guide domestic and international governance toward improving life on our planet.
41 41 Further discussion of this prospect is provided in "Does Uneven Expected Risk Promote Poverty and Instability?"
. Departure of U from the bliss asymptote at t = 0. V(t) = V(a) Time-averaged instant utility of productive activity. V V(t) on the bliss asymptote. ∆V, ∆U, ∆L Departure of time-averaged productive, consumptive and leisure instant utilities from the bliss asymptote. ∆V t=0 ,∆L t=0 , ∆L t=0 ∆V, ∆U, ∆L at t=0. v(a)
Marginal instant-utility of productive activity. w Worldline-along which the individual forms an expectation, with certainty, of his or her personal activity time-line, in accordance with expected personal and environmental constraints. X(t') Instantaneous rate of consumption [GOOD/TIME]. x Time-averaged rate of consumption [GOOD/TIME].
GREEK SYMBOLS
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